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TKHJOREDOLQWHUHVWVRI/RQGRQ¶Vcommercial community, 1599-1625: investment in the 
East India Company 
 
The English East India Company (EIC) has long been identified as an organisation that 
foreshadowed developments in finance, investment and overseas expansion that would come 
to fruition over the course of the following two centuries.  However, in spite of its importance, 
little detail has been recovered about the economic and financial environment in which it 
developed ± a challenge exacerbated by the dearth of statistical analysis relating to the early 
seventeenth century.  7KHRGRUH5DEE¶VEnterprise and Empire is probably the most detailed 
attempt to reconstruct the necessary data, but his focus rested on differences between gentry 
and mercantile participation in overseas activity rather than the investment practices of 
participants.1  By focussing on how members of the EIC chose to invest in activities across the 
globe this article will offer a re-assessment both of investment practices in the early seventeenth 
FHQWXU\DQGRIWKHVXSSRVHGIDFWLRQDOLVPDQGGLYLVLRQWKDWGRPLQDWHVWKH&RPSDQ\¶VKLVWRU\ 
Recent work has shed a great amount of detail on the later seventeenth century, and 
$QQ&DUORV(ULQ)OHWFKHUDQG/DUU\1HDO¶V UHFHQWDQDO\VLVRISRUWIROLRFDSLWDOLVPEHWZHHQ
1690 and 1730 did a remarkable job of reconstructing investment practices.2  They concluded 
only small numbers of investors showed interest in diversification.3  As this article will 
demonstrate, the picture was very different a hundred years earlier, and investors in the EIC 
were much more likely to participate in other ventures.  Specifically, it will analyse investment 
portfolios of EIC members at three points - in 1599, 1613 and 1624.4 In doing so, the article 
will expose WKHJOREDOLQWHUHVWVRI/RQGRQ¶VFRPPHUFLDOFRPPXQLW\5 
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 Ibid., p. 588. 
4
 The members of the East India Company are taken from BL IOR/A/1 and BL IOR/B/1-10. Although there are 
gaps in the records, this dataset includes the vast majority of EIC members, with members missing from the dataset 
reserved to those who joined the Company and then left within the short time periods missing from the records. 
5
 Information about investments in other ventures is drawn from a range of material. For various ventures: TNA 
SP/12; TNA SP/14; TNA CO/77; Carr (ed.), Select Charters; +HU0DMHVW\¶VStationary Office, Cecil Papers; 
Sainsbury (ed.), Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, America and West Indies; Idem., Calendar of State Papers, 
Colonial series, East Indies, China and Japan. For the Virginia Company: The Library of Congress, The Thomas 
Jefferson Papers, Series 8 µ9LUJLQLD 5HFRUG 0DQXVFULSWV -¶ +HQLQJ HG The Statutes at Large; 
Kingsbury (ed.), Records of the Virginia Company; BL, Additional Ms 12596; KHLC, SA/ZB/2/66. Levant 
Company: Charter in Richard Hakluyt (ed.), The Principall Navigations, Voiages, Traffiques and Discoveries of 
the English Nation Made by Sea or Ouer-land, to the Remote and Farthest Distant Quarters of the Earth, at Any 
Time Within the Compasse of these 1500 yeeres: deuided into three severall volumes, according to the positions 
of these regions, whereunto they were directed (London: 1598-1600) pp. 73-92; TNA SP/12 12-13, 41-4, 140, 
239, 241, 41-4; TNA SP/14 10; TNA SP/105, 110; TNA SP/105, 143; TNA SP 105, 147-8; BL Cotton Ms Nero 
B 8, 9, 10, 11; BL, Lansdowne 60, 112; TNA C66/1224, 17. Barbary Company: BL, Additional Ms 30567; BL, 
Lansdowne 112; BL, Cotton Ms Nero B XI. Exploratory ventures: Frobisher & Collinson (ed.) The Three 
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In addition to joint-stock organisation this article includes data drawn from merchant 
membership in regulated companies where the payment of a fee enabled participation in a 
particular trade rather than a purchase of stock.  With this in mind, this article is interested less 
in understanding how investors sought to diversify their investments in a liquid stock market ± 
ZKLFKGLGQ¶WH[LVWLQWKHHDUO\VHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\± but instead on understanding the global 
interests of EIC members.  Our understanding of the company had been skewed by 
historiography focussing on divides across the commercial community which are not found in 
an analysis of their investments.  The widespread interests identified through EIC members¶ 
investments practices suggest a level of interconnection and shared participation offer new 
DYHQXHVLQKRZZHDSSURDFKWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI(QJODQG¶VHFRQRP\LQWKHHDUO\VHYHQWHHQWK
century and the history of the British empire.   
Historians have produced a huge volume of work seeking to understand how, when, 
and in what form the empire developed. In the traditional narrative, its development is rooted 
in the Atlantic World, first through the colonisation of Ireland and then through the conquest 
of land and development of settlements on the North American coast and in the Caribbean.6  
Not surprisingly, ventures in the Atlantic and the colonisation of North America and the 
Caribbean have received a greater deal of scholarly attention than activities elsewhere.7 
 In spite of this preponderance of work on the Atlantic, it would be wrong to forget that 
tKHHDUO\µHPSLUH¶JUHZIURPthis broad array of ventures, both colonial and commercial, and 
                                                          
Voyages; TNA SP/12 1, 20, 34, 124, 126, 226; BL, Cotton Ms, Otho 8. Eastland Company: TNA C66/1185, 21-
6; CMAY, 1/5/3/5/1-7; CMAY, Acts and Ordinances; CMAY, Miscellaneous Assessments and Accounts. French 
Company: BL, Additional Ms 30671, 48101. Guinea and Benin Company: TNA SP/14 141. Irish Company: Irish 
Society, A Concise View; Brewer & Bullen (eds.), Calendar of the Carew Manuscripts; TNA, C66/2068, 18. 
Merchant Adventurers: BL, Additional Ms 19913; BL, Stowe Ms 303; BL, Lansdowne Ms, 150, 10, 487; TNA, 
SP/39 8; KHLC, U269/1/B82/14, m 689. Muscovy Company: Charter in Hakluyt, Principall Navigations, pp. 
304-16; BL, Additional Ms 30671; BL, Sloane Ms 1543; LMA CLC/BN/195/1; BL, Lansdowne Ms 60, 142, 112, 
30; BL, Cotton Ms Nero B XI; TNA SP/91 2; TNA, C66/1992, 5. New England Company: Deane (ed.), Records 
of the Council for New England; TNA, CO 5/902. Newfoundland Company: BL, Cotton Ms, Otho 8; TNA, 
C66/2313, 7. Somers Island (Bermuda) Company: Lefroy (ed.), Memorials of Discovery; TNA, CO 38/1. Spanish 
Company: BL, Additional Ms 9365; BL, Lansdowne Ms 112, 60, 3, 86, 13, 487; TNA, SP/14/12-14; TNA, 
C66/1158, 49.  For prominent members of the EIC, The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (ODNB) 
contains additional information, particularly regarding family ties. Information has only been included for 
members of the EIC when there is no contradictory data and when there are no multiple records with the same 
name.  Data from secondary sources have been drawn, particularly in relation to Merchant Adventurers and 
investors in privateering from the appendices of Rabb, Enterprise and Empire and Andrews, Elizabethan 
Privateering. 
6
 Canny (ed.), Origins of Empire 
7
 Armitage and Braddick (eds.), British Atlantic World; Coffman, Leonard and 2¶5HLOO\HGVAtlantic World; 
Mancke and Shammas (eds.), Creation of the British Atlantic; Macinnes and Williamson, Shaping the Stuart 
World; Macmillan, The Atlantic Imperial Constitution.   
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connections DFURVV(QJODQG¶VJOREDODFWLYLWLHVGHVHUYHPRUHDWWHQWLRQ.8 Instead, historians have 
often separated trading organisations from colonial practices and have sought to analyse 
FRPSDQLHV DV VHSDUDWH LQVWLWXWLRQV 0RVW VWULNLQJO\ 5REHUW %UHQQHU¶V Merchants and 
Revolution paints the EIC as an organisation stemming from import-focused trading ventures 
in the Mediterranean and Europe. Brenner argues that these ventures were organised by a group 
RIPHUFKDQWVZKRµWHQGHG LQFUHDVLQJO\ WRFRQVWLWXWHDXQLILHGJURXSDQGWRWUHDWHDFKQHZ
YHQWXUHLQWKHH[SDQVLRQDU\SURFHVVDVSDUWRIDVLQJOHSURMHFW¶Joing so far as to call the group 
the Levant-East India Company combine, a faction he dismisses as conservative, royalist and 
unable to develop the models necessary for successful colonisation.9 For Brenner, these two 
linked companies grew from a group of merchants opposed to the Merchant Adventurers, who 
had previously dominated /RQGRQ¶V politics and trade. He makes a clear distinction between 
the new group, which sought to establish new import trades with England, and the older group, 
with its interest in the export of English woollen goods.10 Brenner also paints a divide between 
the Levant-East India Combine members and individuals who conducted colonial and 
privateering activities, particularly in the Atlantic.11 
0XFK RI %UHQQHU¶V ZRUN IRFXVHV RQ WKH &LYLO War and mercantile involvement in 
English politics during this later period, but this analysis is largely predicated on his 
understanding of the EIC as a small, elite and marginal player. %UHQQHU¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQremains 
a powerful force in historiography, providing a simple narrative for historians of related topics 
to similarly side-line discussion of trading activities+LVWRULHVRIODWHUSHULRGVXVH%UHQQHU¶V
interpretation to paint an RYHUVLPSOLILHGµRULJLQVWRU\¶RIoverseas expansion, which can limit 
our understanding of the role played by the EIC and other trading organisations.12   
 Recently, historians have noted this marginalisation and sought to highlight 
connections between English activities across the globe, particularly between agents on the 
ground overseas.13 Through these studies, the connectivity of English activity during this 
                                                          
8
  The limitations of Atlantic history have been explored in depth. See: Coclanis, Games, Mapp and Stern, 
µ)RUXP%H\RQGWKH$WODQWLF¶*DPHVµ$+5)RUXP¶; Greene and Morgan (eds.), Atlantic History: a critical 
appraisal. 
9
 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 14, 48-51, 61-74. 
10
 Ibid. pp. 51-61. 
11
 Ibid. pp. 92-148. 
12
 Brenner is very broadly used in this manner, principally as a means to exSODLQµWKHVLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHV
EHWZHHQ$WODQWLFµQHZPHUFKDQWV¶DQGWKHHQWUHQFKHGPRQRSRO\WUDGHUV¶LQZRUNVERWKFRYHULQJWKHVHYHQWHHQWK
century and later periods. Cowan, Social Life of Coffee, p. 276. 
13
 This is particularly clear in attempts to integrate Atlantic history with English activities in Asia. See, Lauren 
%HQWRQµ7KH%ULWLVK$WODQWLFLQD*OREDO&RQWH[W¶LQ$UPLWDJHDQG%UDGGLFNHGVBritish Atlantic World.  For 
a detailed comparison of corporate strategies regarding shipping: Hejeebu, ³2ZQ5HQWRU5HQW-6HHN´   
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period is becoming clearer, and the EIC is emerging as an important field of study.14 Rather 
than focusing on the haphazard and disparate qualities of empire, this work instead seeks to 
uncover networks brought about by oceanic travel and communication. In wide-ranging 
examinations of English overseas commerce in the early seventeenth century, the lives of 
(QJOLVK µFRVPRSROLWDQV¶ KDYH RIIHUHG D VXSHUE RSportunity for analysis.15  Here, the 
µRYHUODSSLQJ DQG LQWHUVHFWLQJ ZRUOGV RI FRPPHUFLDO DQG FRORQLDO HQWHUSULVH¶ are brought 
together through the experience of travellers who represented substantial connectedness across 
ventures that remained decentralised throughout this period.16 This approach enables the 
examination of both the global interests of individuals in the British ePSLUHDQGKRZDJHQWV¶
experiences connect different ventures around the world.17   
This article will analyse the vast array of connections across the organisations that drove 
overseas expansion and reveal the density and interdependence of commercial networks in 
England in the early modern period.18 These links make it clear that each new venture 
developed through the investment and action of people with a wide range of experience; skills 
that could be brought to the table in developing a new ventures governance and policy. This 
was not just the case with the leaders of new companies; the generality was also able to 
influence decision making.19 As such, understanding the social context and practices of 




Towards the end of the sixteenth century the investment opportunities available to merchants 
and other commercial actors expanded rapidly as new corporations sought to take advantage 
of new opportunities across the globe.  From the foundation of the Muscovy Company in 1555, 
the establishment of the Turkey Company in 1581 with its meagre twelve investors, the 
expansion of the Spanish Company in 1570 with 522 members, and numerous other ventures 
people could carefully select where to invest their time, capital and goods.  Using a range of 
                                                          
14
 Bowen, Mancke, and Reid (eds.), %ULWDLQ¶V2FHDQLF(PSLUH.  3KLOLS6WHUQ³+LVWRU\DQG+LVWRULRJUDSK\RIWKH
(QJOLVK(DVW,QGLD&RPSDQ\´,ELG³7KH(QJOLVK(DVW,QGLD&RPSDQ\DQGWKH0RGHUQ&RUSRUDWLRQ´ 
15
 Games, Web of Empire; Ogborn, Global Lives. 
16
 Games, Web of Empire, pp. 6-15. 
17
 Ogborn, Global Lives; Rothschild, Inner Lives of Empire; Hancock, Citizens of the World. 
18
 London was the centre of overseas activity from England but other ports did contain considerable commercial 
communities of their own. Sacks, The Widening Gate, pp. 19-130. 
19
 The directors, called assistants, committees and council members in different organisations, were responsible 
for the day-to-day running of companies, while the generality contained all free-brothers, adventurers or 
members of the company.  Bowen, Business of Empire, pp. 62-78. 
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organisational and financial models, these activities allowed participants to either invest 
directly, such as in joint-stock companires, or through membership in organisations that 
allowed members to undertake their own private voyages.20  Across these activities hundreds 
and hundreds of people participated LQ (QJODQG¶V RYHUVHDV H[SDQVLRQ. By examining their 
commercial interests we can develop a more nuanced understanding of the motivations, 
expectations and experiences that drove the expansion of the emerging British empire. 
 That being said, even smaller investments in the EIC were considerably higher than 
membership fees or average investments in other overseas activities.21 The membership criteria 
for the Spanish Company, which was reformed in 1604, charged up to £20 for membership.22 
Unlike the EIC, which acted as an investment vehicle that would produce returns without active 
participation, the Spanish Company membership gave members the right to enter into trade 
with Spain on their own behalf.  They would then invest in their own ships or goods that would 
EH WUDQVSRUWHG XQGHU WKH FRPSDQ\¶V FKDUWHU  ,Q WKH HQG WKLV FRXOG OHDG WR KXJH SHUVRQDO
investment, with hundreds or thousands of pounds expended on each voyage.23 Similarly, the 
most popular colonial activities had similarly low initial costs for investors.  The Virginia 
Company allowed investment from £12 10s, and the most common investment by merchants 
was between thirty and forty pounds.24  Investment in the Irish Company could be even lower, 
with members investing through their livery companies contributing as little as 2s to the 
colony.25  Participation in overseas activities was not beyond the means of numerous merchants 
LQ/RQGRQDQGLW¶VQRWVXUSULVLQJWKDWPDQ\WRRNDGYDQWDJHDQGhad interests across a number 
of different enterprises. 
The dates selected to examine the EIC membership represent important flash points in 
this history of the Company. First, in 1599 over a hundred investors were drawn together to 
fund and found the East India Company by sending a petition to Queen Elizabeth for a charter.26  
7KHSHWLWLRQZKLFKLQFOXGHGµWKHQDPHVRIVXFKSHUVRQVWRYHQWXUHLQWRWKHYR\DJHWRWKH(DVW
,QGLHV¶LQFOXGHGWKHQDPHVRILQYHVWRUVZKRtogether invested £30,133 6s and 8d in the 
new company.27  Although recent English attempts east had ended in disaster, profitable 
voyages conducted by Dutch merchants in the 1590s, and the success of new trading 




 For the value of investments in other companies see: Scott, Constitution and Finance, pp. 150-161. 
22
 BL, Harley Ms 295, f. 211±212v. 
23
 LMA, CLC/B/013/Ms23953. 
24
 KHLC, SA/ZB/2/66. 
25
 The &ORWKZRUNHUV¶ Company, CL/B/1/4, f. 129. 
26





endeavours to the Levant and Muscovy would have encouraged potential investors of the 
FRPSDQ\¶V potential. 
By 1613, the Company had undertaken a series of successful voyages that had achieved 
profits of 155%, with dividend payments ranging from 16% to 300% in 1614 reflecting the 
generally buoyant atmosphere within the Company regarding the trade.28 It is unlikely that 
many investors would have been disappointed with the performance of the Company at this 
time and it is unsurprising that in 1613, on the return of a successful fleet, the Company was 
able to raise £400,000 of investment in less than two weeks.29 Additionally, most of the other 
major companies from this period had now been established, such as the Virginia Company in 
1606, the French Company in 1611 and investment to search for a North-West Passage after 
1612 all proving attractive propositions. Coupled with the expansion of the Levant Company 
after 1600 and the resurgence of the Spanish trade in 1604, this was a period where both 
traditional and new trading ventures obtained considerable investment. Therefore, there is 
substantial evidence to analyse how investors developed portfolios and enough variety in the 
types of their investment to draw some conclusions about how early modern people assessed 
the emerging global opportunities around them. 
Finally, 1624 sits during the fall-out from events that rocked the Company in the 1620s, 
including the Amboyna massacre and the decision to conquer Ormuz from the Portuguese. 
Whereas 1613 sat at the end of a period of great returns, by 1624 the EIC would have been less 
confident about the satisfactions of investors. While profits remained high at 87% for the first 
joint stock between 1613 and 1623, and the 1624 dividend was awarded at 6.25%, the Company 
was beginning to struggle financially, taking out large loans the same year.30 As such, 1624 
was a time when investors in the EIC were selling their stock in larger numbers and when 
concerns regarding the future of the Company had a major impact on investment choices. 
Furthermore, in 1624 the Company wrote a petition to the King requesting support for the 
Company, which included a list of investors in the company at this moment in time.31 
Therefore, while in 1613 we can analyse the portfolios of all investors who had invested in the 
Company up to this point, in 1624 we can analyse the portfolios of all investors who were part 
of the Company at the same time. 
                                                          
28
 Chaudhuri, English East India Company, pp. 22, 210. 
29
 TNA, SP 14/75/28. 
30
 Chaudhuri, English East India Company, 213. 
31
 TNA, SP/14, 27th June 1625, The most humble supplication of the generality of Adventurers trading to the 
East Indies to the King. 
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In the following discussion, the areas where EIC members invested will be divided into 
three groups: ventures dedicated to trading, to colonial enterprise, or to exploration.32 The 
µWUDGLQJ¶VXEVHWLQFOXGHGWKHBarbary Company, Spanish Company, French Company, Levant 
&RPSDQ\0XVFRY\&RPSDQ\0HUFKDQW$GYHQWXUHUV¶DQGVPDOOHUFRPSDQLHVGHGLFDWHG WR
trading.33 As trading ventures these organisations were, in comparison to the other subsets, less 
risky endeavours that operated in shorter time frames, with returns consequently expected 
TXLFNO\7KHµQRQ-WUDGLQJ¶VXEVHWRQWKHRWKHUKDQGLQFOXGHVprivateering ventures in the 1580s 
and 1590s, the Virginia Company, Irish Company, Somers Island Company and Hudson Bay 
Company.34 These were higher risk ventures with much longer time frames, as they relied on 
the successful development of overseas facilities before goods could be developed for import 
into England. They were also enterprises where the establishment of rule overseas would be 
required and often had a greater military focus than the trading ventures. Many of these 
ventures hoped to produce commodity imports to England but obtaining these was not a simple 
exchange of goods. FiQDOO\ WKHYHQWXUHV IRUµH[SORUDWLRQ¶LQFOXGHGWKH1RUWK-West Passage 
Company from 1612 and other smaller ventures to discover new sea routes, often with the aim 
of reaching Asia. These were the riskiest ventures in terms of potential for profit, and none 
were successful. However, they were also inexpensive by comparison and had hopes of returns 
that far exceeded investments. Although not perfect divisions, these groupings will help 
demonstrate that EIC members invested in diverse types of enterprise. Through analysing the 
investment of EIC members beyond the Company, I will demonstrate how the separation 
within historiography of the British empire, between the Atlantic and the rest of the world in 





                                                          
32
 There is an extensive historiography of these ventures. Works covering the full range of English overseas 
activities during this period include Brenner, Merchants and Revolution; Rabb, Enterprise and Empire.  
33
 For the Levant Company see Epstein, Early History of the Levant Company; Goffman, Izmir and the 
Levantine World; Wood, History of the Levant Company. For the Muscovy Company see, Willian, Early 
History of the Russia Company. For the Eastland Company see, Hinton, Eastland Trade. For the Merchant 
Adventurers see, Bisson, Merchant Adventurers of England/LQJHOEDFNµ7KH0HUFKDQW$GYHQWXUHUV¶; Unwin, 
µ7KH0HUFKDQW$GYHQWXUHUV&RPSDQ\¶. 
34
 For the Virginia Company see, Craven, Virginia Company of London; Mancall (ed.), The Atlantic World and 
Virginia)RUWKH1HZIRXQGODQG&RPSDQ\VHH&HOOµ7KH1HZIRXQGODQG&RPSDQ\¶. For the Somers Island 
(Bermuda) Company and attempts at a West Indian Compan\VHH$SSOHE\µ$Q$VVRFLDWLRQIRUWKH:HVW
Indies?¶; Wilkinson, Adventurers of Bermuda. For privateering see, Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering.  For 
other American ventures see, Roper, English Empire in America. 
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First though, it is worth examining how the value of EIC stock changed over the course of this 
period.  Obtaining large sums of capital for investment depended, usually, on successful early 
endeavours coupled with late marriage and a generous personal network ± including an 
LQYHVWRU¶VRZQIDPLO\EXWDOVRWKURXJKDSSUHQWLFHVKLSDQGPDUULDJH35  TKH&RPSDQ\¶VRULJLQDO
petition to Elizabeth I, on 22 September 1599, included numerous investments of between £100 
and £200, but the opportunity to join the Company for this amount was not to last. Only two 
GD\VODWHUDWWKHILUVW*HQHUDO&RXUWKHOGE\WKH&RPSDQ\LWZDVUHVROYHGµWKDWIURPKHQFHIRUWK
no adventurer in this voyage shall be received to adventure in the same for a less some then 
¶36 2Q  2FWREHU  WKH &RXUW RI &RPPLWWHHV FODULILHG WKDW µWKHUH VKDOO EH QR
DGYHQWXUHUUHIXVHGWKDWZLOODGYHQWXUHXQWLOWKHZKROHDGYHQWXUHGRHULVHDERYH¶
indicating that membership in the Company was, at least for the time being, open to any London 
merchant with capital to invest.37  
 Rather than being traded or exchanged in a public stock market, as would be the case 
with stock later in the seventeenth century, investors in the EIC were only allowed to be 
exchanged in meetings of the Court of Committees, and were recorded in the official company 
accounts.38 Access to the Court of Committees, or at least access to existing members of the 
Company, was important for anyone hoping to invest in the EIC, personal relationships were 
an important means obtaining this. In 1618, the directors reported that investment in the 
Company was full and explained that the investment had reached this level through current 
PHPEHUV LQWURGXFLQJ WKHLU µIULHQGV DQG IROORZHUV¶ Lnto the Company.39  After 1610 the 
company was licenced to extend membership to foreign merchants.40  7KHVH ZHUHQ¶W MXVW
negligible shareholders eithers, for example, in 1614 a Dutchman was allowed to join the 
company, investing £6000 after agreeing to swear an oath to King James and being vouched 
for by existing members of the company.41  The role played by personal relationships in 
encouraging investment in the EIC was still vitally important and the networks of Company 
members were vital for attracting further funding to the Company. 
While the records for the transactions of stock are not extant for all of the period, it is 
possible to analyse the records for all of 1624-25. Over these two years, there were 104 
transactions in EIC stock, with seventy-five different individuals receiving stock and eighty-
                                                          
35
 Grassby, Kinship and Capitalism, pp. 396-408. 
36
 BL IOR/B/1, 24th September 1599. 
37
 BL IOR/B/1, 13th October 1600. 
38
 East India Company, The Lawes or Standing Orders of the East India Company (London: 1621) p. 6. 
39
 BL IOR/B/6, 20th January 1618. 
40
 Green (ed.), Calendar of State Papers, pp. 640-655. 
41
 BL IOR B/5, July 27th 1614. 
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four individuals selling or giving stock. The transactions could be in the form of the sale of 
stock from one person to another or the inheritance of stock from deceased members of the 
Company. In total, the transactions during this period were valued at just over £119,026 with 
an average transaction value of £1,190 ± roughly five times the average investment in 1599 
when the Company was founded. Some individuals purchased or sold stock on multiple 
occasions and figure 1 shows the cumulative value of stock purchased by individuals during 
this period.  
 
 
Figure 1: Value of EIC stock purchased per investor, 1624-5 
The most valuable exchange was when Sir Thomas Smith died and Lady Sara Smith 
and Sir John Smith received £12,700 in stock. The individual who purchased, rather than 
inherited, the greatest value of stock during this period was Maurice Abbot ± the soon to be 
governor of the company - who increased his holdings of EIC stock by £7100 through four 
transactions, receiving stock from Sir William Garraway, Richard Bourne and William Cowper 
± who owned stock in partnership, Nicholas Kempe and Walter Thompson. At the other end of 
the spectrum, the smallest transactions were between Joseph Salbank and Matthew Wills, who 
exchanged £40 of stock, and Edward Lee and Richard Edwards, who exchanged £50. Unlike 
Abbot, none of these men were senior members of the Company and none of them had invested 
in overseas ventures other that the EIC. 
While stock did often rest in the hands of the more experienced and more senior 
members of the Company this was not always the case. In addition to their stock in the EIC, 





























Transactions of EIC stock, 1624-5
10 
 
average of 1.39 ventures per person. Similarly, individuals selling stock had invested in an 
average of 1.46 organisations outside the EIC. This is slightly lower than the average 
experience of all Company members in 1624, who had invested in 1.60 ventures in addition to 
the EIC and could suggest that more experienced members of the Company were more willing 
WRKROGRQWRVWRFNGXULQJWKLVGLIILFXOWSHULRGLQWKH&RPSDQ\¶VKLVWRU\ This is reinforced 
when highlighting that the five largest transactions of stock all took place when members of 
the Company died ± Sir Thomas Smith, Sir William Garraway, Henry Robinson, Sir William 
Kemp and Thomas Wheatly. Not only did this group represent a third of the total stock 
exchanged during this period, but they had also an average of 3.8 investments outside the EIC. 
When experienced members of the Company exchanged their stock, it was rarely because of a 
change in their support for the EIC.  
There was also little correlation between the type of experiences of investors and their 
willingness to sell or purchase stock during this period. Considering the recent collapse of the 
Virginia Company and challenges the EIC was facing in Asia from the Dutch, it might be 
reasonable to suspect that people might be less willing to join the Company or that individuals 
with no desire to participate in non-trading activities might sell their stock. This does not seem 
to be the case though, and as shown in table 1, the split between experience in trading and no 
experience in trading among both receivers and donors of stock was about 50% either way, 
although a slightly higher proportion of investors with non-trading experience purchased stock 











Recipients 104 1.39 55.8% 44.2% 
Donors 123 1.46 50.4% 49.6% 
Table 1: Investment experience of recipients and donors of stock, 1624-5 
 
While the difficulties facing the EIC in this period seem to have done little to deter any 
particular group of investors, the experience lost within the EIC during this period was more 
of a challenge. Across the 84 donors of stock, sixteen had died. While this enabled £52,256 of 
stock to pass into new hands, bringing new blood into the Company, it also meant that the EIC 
lost a number of hugely experienced and long-standing members. The deceased members had 
invested in forty-four ventures between them ± twenty-five non-trading and nineteen trading 
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ventures. Ten members had been part of the Company since 1609, and seven of these since its 
foundation. The stock belonging to the sixteen individuals was distributed across twenty 
transactions, nine of which went to their families. Unlike the deceased, the recipients of this 
stock were much less experienced, having only invested in twenty-one other ventures between 
them before receiving this EIC stock ± eleven non-trading and ten trading ventures. 
Considering a third of these investments were undertaken by Maurice Abbot, the lack of 
experience among the rest of this group becomes even clearer. Six of the recipients had never 
participated in any other overseas venture before, and for twelve it was their first involvement 
with the EIC. Although these new members would have understood the East Indies trade to 
some extent they would not have been able to make up for the loss of experience and expertise 





In 1599 however, when the Company was first conceived, EIC members were not purchasing 
shares from existing members.  The petition to Queen Elizabeth included the names of all 
merchants willing to invest in the company, with promises made for their initial investment.42 
Raising over £30,000, the average investment in the new company was £225. Of these, fifty-
four (39.9%) had invested in other ventures before the foundation of the EIC, sharing 119 
investments between them.  $OWKRXJK PDQ\ RI WKH (,&¶V ILUVW LQYHVWRUV KDG QRW LQYHVWHG
previously, the more experienced members had done so, and as figure 2 shows, these 
investments were placed in a wide variety of ventures. 
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Figure 2(,&PHPEHUV¶LQYHVWPHQWVLQRWKHUYHQWXUHV 1599 
 
 As this demonstrates, the founding members of the EIC drew on a wide range of 
experience.  But equally important, it also reveals the CRPSDQ\¶VDELOLW\WRDWWUDFWLQYHVWPHQW
from across the commercial community.  Furthermore, the most common investments were not 
those most commonly aligned with the EIC.  Privateering the Atlantic and the Merchant 
Adventurers, each with 27 (19.9%) EIC members investing in this area, were more common 
than the Levant or Spanish companies, with 20 (14.7%) and 14 (10.3%) members investing in 
each.  Not surprisingly, numerous members had participated in activities associated with Asian 
products, and interest in exploration and opening new markets would be carried into the EIC.  
Investment in colonisation in America, at the Roanoke Colony and investing in mining in 
England were both uncommon, but these gentry-dominated ventures were less connected to 




























Figure 31: Number of other investments undertaken by EIC members, 1599 
 
In spite of this range of interest, investment portfolios for most EIC members were 
limited, at this point at least, to their single investment in the EIC.  As figure 3 starkly 
demonstrates, only a small number of members had invested widely, and members only 
averaged 0.88 investments in other ventures.  Part of the reason for these small portfolios was 
the limited scope for investment ± there was not yet another large joint-stock company to draw 
investment ± but it also shows how important it was for the EIC to attract merchants investing 
in all areas of England overseas activities to obtain the sums necessary for launching the new 
company.   
Table 2 takes this a step further, to assess how more experienced investors - that is, 
investors in the EIC who also invested in at least two other areas - selected multiple ventures. 
For example, An EIC member who was also participating in two or more other ventures who 
invested in the Merchant Adventurers was 33.3% likely to have invested in the Levant 
Company, 44.4% likely to participate in privateering, and so on. Among investors who had 
invested in multiple ventures, there is little to suggest clear efforts to keep portfolios limited to 
either traditional trading ventures like the Merchant Adventurers, import focused trades like 
the Levant Company, or more militaristic opportunities like privateering.  Again, this shows 
































































































Barbary Company N/A 11.1% 22.2% 44.4% 0% 11.1% 77.8% 
'UDNH¶V9R\DJH 16.7% N/A 66.7% 0% 0% 50.0% 83.3% 
Levant Company 10.0% 20.0% N/A 45.0% 25.0% 30.0% 50.0% 
Merchant Adventurers 14.8% 0% 33.3% N/A 18.5% 22.2% 44.4% 
Muscovy Company 0% 0% 75.0% 62.5% N/A 50.0% 37.5% 
Spanish Company 7.1% 21.4% 42.9% 42.9% 28.6% N/A 50.0% 
Privateering 25.9% 18.5% 37.0% 44.4% 11.1% 25.9% N/A 
Table 2: Likelihood of EIC members investing in two other ventures together, 1599 (the total 
number of EIC investors participating in each venture are included in parentheses) 
 
These relations are visualised in figure 4.43 In this network, each of the nodes and the 




could have been developed through shared commercial enterprise and interaction.  In 1599, the 
shared investments between the fifty-four EIC members with other investments create a 
network with 1717 relationships between members. Modularity analysis has been used to 
identify prominent communities within the network.  The darkest shade shows merchants with 
investments in privateering while the paler shade delineates members of the Levant Company 
and the Merchant Adventurers trade in woollen cloth.  While some members were drawn into 
the peripheral clusters with only a single investment interest, many were drawn towards the 
central, messy mass of the network where no clear investment trends form secondary clusters 
                                                          
43
 This network was developed and analysed using methodological tools discussed in detail in 6PLWK³1HWZRUNV´
pp. 15-29. 
44
 Games, Web of Empire, p. 81. 
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that would identify the existence of popular portfolio choices.  7KH VL]H RI DQ LQYHVWRU¶V
portfolio is demonstrated by the size of their node, and the largest nodes represent the people 
whose numerous activities represented experiences across the range of ventures available.    
Directors selected to represent the company during the petition process were also likely to have 
experience of other ventures. For instance, of the five directors with holdings in the Levant 
Company, three were also engaged in other, riskier ventures in addition to their investment in 
the EIC.  While directors were less experienced than they would become, there is no clear 
dominance of the EIC by directors with experience in any other single venture, and certainly 
not enough to conclude the new company was little more than a spin off from the Levant 
organisation.  Many had considerable experience in areas relating to higher-risk, more 
belligerent activities ± such as privateering or 'UDNH¶VFLUFXPQDYLJDWLRQRIWKHJOREH 7KLV
suggests an awareness that the Company had much in common with these areas of overseas 
activity, and perhaps that the petition would be more likely to find acceptance in court if its 




Figure 41HWZRUNUHSUHVHQWLQJ(,&PHPEHUV¶FRPPHUFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSV, 1599 
At its foundation, the EIC network was not an organisation dominated by Levant 
Company merchants, nor indeed merchants from any external company.  Instead, this network 
GHPRQVWUDWHV WKH JOREDO LQWHUHVWV RI /RQGRQ¶V FRPPHUFLDO FRPPXQLW\ LQWHUHVWV WKDW ZRXOG





By 1613, English investors had participated in activities ranging from traditional trading with 
Europe to colonial ventures in North America to desperate searches for a North-west passage. 
Hundreds of new investors had entered the commercial community, bringing new experiences 
17 
 
and new equity to its many trading ventures. The EIC attracted a huge amount of this 
investment and raised a further £517,784 of capital between 1601 and 1612.45 Within this 
environment, where investment in overseas ventures was increasingly common, the EIC was 
one of the most popular companies and had attracted at least 536 investors by 1613. The sum 
raised during this period by the Company would suggest that after running for thirteen years, 
the average investment in the EIC had risen to just under £1,000.  These new investors created 
an organisation that was able to send multiple voyages to Asia, build its own dockyard in 
London, establish a colony in Ireland and begin to dominate the social and political life of many 
in the City of London.  
 In total, 372 (69.4%) EIC members were also investors in another venture, sharing 1510 
different investments between them. 7KH &RPSDQ\¶V PHPEHUV GLYHUVH H[SHULHQFHV ZRXOG
influence how they believed the EIC should be organised. As seen in figure 5, Company 
members who invested in other ventures did so across the full range of opportunities 
available.46  
                                                          
45
 Chaudhuri, English East India Company, p. 22. This was larger than the total investment in any other 
Company during this period. For example, the Virginia Company raised a total of £200,000, the Irish 
Companies £100,000 and the North-West Passage Company £12,600. Rabb, Enterprise and Empire, p. 66. 
46
 )RUHDVHRIXVHVRPHRIWKHVPDOOHUYHQWXUHVKDYHEHHQJURXSHGWRJHWKHUDVµRWKHU¶µ2WKHUFRORQLDO¶LQFOXGHG
the Hudson Bay Company, which included seventeen members of the EIC, and the Somers Island Company, 
ZKLFKLQFOXGHGWKLUWHHQ7KHµRWKHUSULYDWHHULQJ¶VHFWLRQLQFOXGHV(,&PHPEHUVZKRKDGSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKH






Traditional trading ventures most commonly associated with the EIC were not the most 
common investment by its members. In fact, new colonial ventures attracted the interest of 
more members. The Virginia Company was the most popular investment, with 174 (32.5%) 
participating in this venture. This was closely followed by investors in the resurgent Spanish 
trade after 1604 (25.4%) and those seeking the North-west passage in 1612 (26.3%). The 
Levant, French and Irish companies form a third tier of companies, each attracting a significant 
number of EIC investors. The Virginia Company and Irish Companies had been developed to 
take advantage of colonial opportunities in Ireland and North America, suggesting that 
opposition to colonial ventures was not a key driver for investors in the EIC during this period. 
Many merchants were willing to place their money into ventures doing exactly that in other 
parts of the world. This suggests that later debates regarding the non-trading direction of the 
EIC were not a question of insiders versus outsiders, but were considered based on the wide 
































Figure 6: Number of other investments undertaken by EIC members, 1613 
 
While the great number of members who invested in colonial activities in 1613 
demonstrates the importance oI VXFK DFWLYLWLHV ORRNLQJ DW WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI PHPEHUV¶
portfolios in more detail reveals some individual proclivities regarding colonial and trading 
ventures. We can assess where multiple investors were most likely to place their investments. 
If the commercial community were indeed divided between those seeking colonial or trading 
ventures, it would suggest that people would be more likely to invest in multiple ventures of a 
similar type. As figure 6 demonstrates, many EIC members had invested in more than one other 
activity. On average, EIC members had invested in 2.82 other ventures by 1613. Considering 
the range of investment opportunities available it would have been possible for people to select 
investment choices depending on their particularly ideologies and preferences regarding 
overseas trade. For example, investors in traditional trading ventures such as the Spanish 
Company might be expected to invest in similar types of venture across their portfolio, 
selecting similar risks, profit expectations and time commitment.  In the traditional Brenner 
interpretation, we would expect to see distinctly separate groups of merchants investing in trade 
or colonial activities, the Atlantic or Asia, and perhaps a small rump of Merchant Adventurers 
detached from the rest.  
However, as demonstrated in table 3 (,& PHPEHUV¶ LQYHVWPHQWV ZHUH KHOG DFURVV
multiple ventures and there was considerable overlap between investment in different types of 
overseas venture. An EIC member who invested in the Virginia Company was 24.1% likely to 
have invested in the Levant Company, 22.9% likely to be part of the French Company, and so 
on. Among investors who had invested in multiple ventures, several correlations indicate how 



















Other investments held by EIC members
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Company participated in the Spanish Company 45.3% of the time and investors in the North-
West Passage Company were 46.9% likely to be investors in the Virginia Company too. EIC 
members who invested in the Levant Company also invested in the French Company 29.5% of 
the time and the Spanish Company 34.9%. These same Levant Company investors were also 
38.7% likely to have invested in the Virginia Company and 24.8% likely to have invested in 
the North-West Passage Company. On the other hand, some companies were much less likely 
to attract the same investor. EIC members who had invested in the Spanish Company were 
very unlikely to take part in the Irish plantation projects organised by the Irish Company, with 
only 17.1% doing so. Similarly, investors in the North-West Passage Company were 
considerably less likely to invest in the Spanish or Levant Companies than they were in the 
Virginia Company.  
This suggest that some investors did therefore build portfolios depending on the strategy 
of different ventures, and so there was, to an extent, a divide between those who preferred to 
SODFHWKHLUPRQH\LQµWUDGLQJ¶DQGWKRVHZKRSUHIHUUHGWRSODFHLWLQµQRQ-WUDGLQJ¶YHQWXUHV
However, many investors did not take this approach, investing their money on an opportunity-
by-opportunity assessment of the particular risks involved, or through the persuasion of trusted 
members of their commercial networks. As such, historiography dominated by easily defined 
factions within this community, and trends that separate the Atlantic and Indian ocean world, 
suffers from an over simplification of the complex decision-making processes of early modern 
merchants.  By placing the EIC in a global environment of interconnected English ventures we 























































































Virginia Company N/A 24.1% 22.9% 20.1% 10.3% 33.3% 25.9% 
Levant Company 38.7% N/A 29.5% 19.4% 12.4% 24.8% 34.9% 
French Company 37.2% 34.0% N/A 23.6% 16.0% 37.7% 45.3% 
Irish Company 46.9% 22.9% 30.1% N/A 16.0% 32.0% 23.4% 
21 
 
Merchant Adventurers 43.2% 31.9% 29.8% 27.7% N/A 35.2% 33.3% 
North-West Passage 
Company 56.3% 21.9% 29.7% 24.2% 12.5% N/A 22.7% 
Spanish Company 32.5% 30.9% 34.1% 17.1% 15.4% 21.1% N/A 
Table 3: Likelihood of EIC members investing in two other ventures together, 1613 
To make these correlations more visible, in figure 7 the placement of other investments 
by EIC members has been broken down by the likelihood of members to have invested in 
particular types of venture depending on the size of their portfolios. Regular investors are 
members who had invested in five or more ventures by 1613, repeat investors are those with 
three or four investments, and occasional investors those members with two or less. The 
SURSRUWLRQRI(,&PHPEHUVLQYHVWLQJLQµWUDGLQJ¶YHQWXUHVGRHVQRWGRPLQDWHWKHFKDUWIndeed, 
for more experienced investors with larger portfolios, the number of EIC members taking part 
LQµQRQ-WUDGLQJ¶DFWLYLWLHVwere actually higher. This indicates that the more senior members of 
WKHPHUFKDQWFRPPXQLW\ZKRKDGWKHPRVWLQIOXHQFHZLWKLQWKH&RPSDQ\¶VQHWZRUNGLGQRW
shy away from undertaking colonial or privateering ventures. This implies that these 
experienced members would have been comfortable utilising similar strategies in the Asian 
trade if they were deemed suitable for the region. However, for EIC members with fewer 
investments it was slightly more likely that these would focus on trading ventures. 
 
 


























































EIC members grouped by






The level of interaction between EIC members through their commercial relationships 
is visualised in figure 8. In this network, where shared investments alone are used to represent 
the connectivity of the community, the 392 members of the EIC who had invested elsewhere 
are connected through 40,303 relationships and shared experiences. Once again, analysing 
modularity has identified the prominent communities within this network. In the simplest 
sense, the darkest grey shows colonial investments, white Levant and Spanish Company 
investments, and light grey the French, Irish and Merchant Adventurer companies. A degree of 
commonality can be seen in investment made by people who had participated in one or two 
ventures. A significant number of Company members, however, shared investments across a 
wide range of different ventures and were not part of clearly defined clusters, or factions, within 
the EIC network.  Instead, the larger nodes making up the central mass of the network show 






Figure 8: Network representing EIC mHPEHUV¶FRPPHUFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSV, 1613 
IQ WKH&RPSDQ\FDQQRWEHQHDWO\GHOLQHDWHGEHWZHHQPHPEHUVZLWK µWUDGLQJ¶
LQWHUHVWVDQGPHPEHUVZLWKµQRQ-WUDGLQJ¶LQWHUHVWVVLQFHPDQ\LQYHVWRUVdeveloped interests 
that combined all types of overseas ventures. While clusters do exist, they were deeply 
embedded into the community through relationships with many other members with different 
experiences. Prominently, the directors of the Company did not sit within just one of the 
communities identified here; the majority were drawn to the centre of the network. The 
directors were individuals who had experienced many different types of venture and had 
relationships with people across the full spread of English overseas expansion. Thomas Smith, 
the Governor of the EIC, was similarly well connected. During this period, he led a number of 
other overseas ventures, including the Virginia, Levant, the North-West Passage, Hudson Bay 
and Muscovy Companies. Smith and these other senior members undertook the management 
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of the EIC, and they were driven in their decision-making by knowledge and experience taken 
IURP WKHVH RWKHU YHQWXUHV DQG WKURXJK WKHVH UHODWLRQVKLSV $V VXFK WKH GLUHFWRU¶V UDQJH RI
interests shows them to be individuals whoVHLQWHUHVWVFURVVHGDQGFRQQHFWHGDOORI(QJODQG¶V
overseas activities, men who were willing to utilise a wide range of strategies in order to 




Eleven years later, in 1624, the Company had started to struggle. Profits were still high, albeit 
declining, but increasing difficulties in Asia, particularly conflict with the Dutch, was making 
the EIC less attractive to some investors. In spite of these difficulties, the EIC had continued 
to attract investment throughout this period, receiving £418,691 in investment between 1613 
and 1623 through its first joint stock and starting, from 1621, to raise further funds through a 
second-joint stock that would value £1,629,040 by 1632.47 Yet while new investors had joined 
the ranks of the EIC, they did so in a more cautious commercial environment, with worries 
about an economic depression concerning many, and the failure of some ventures to generate 
profit off-putting for others. Analysing the commercial interests and experiences of the 
members of the Company who remained involved in the EIC up to 1624 can assess whether 
any particular group left the Company because of these challenges.  
TKH &RPSDQ\¶V  PHPEHUV LQFOXGHG VRPH RI WKH PRVW VHQLRU DQG H[SHULHQFHG
PHUFKDQWV IURP/RQGRQ¶VFRPPHUFial community.48 Among these were Sir Thomas Smith, 
who held £12,700 of EIC stock when he died in 1625; William Palmer, who had invested in at 
least ten different projects during the previous two decades; and William Cockaine, who left 
an estate of over £72,000 to his children in 1626.49 Across the membership of the Company, 
152 (63.6%) had invested elsewhere, sharing 432 different investments between them (1.76 
each). This was a slightly smaller percentage of members investing in other ventures than had 
been the case in 1613, but it remained the case that a majority of EIC members had experiences 
of overseas activities outside this organisation. Figure 9 shows the number of different 
                                                          
47
 Chaudhuri, East India Company, p. 22. Rather than rolling stock over from one voyage to the next, the EIC 
launched a joint stock in 1613 that was intended to be used for multiple voyages and to fund the expansion of 
WKH&RPSDQ\¶VWUDGLQJLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLQ$VLDDQGLWVIDFLOLWLHVLQ(QJODQG 
48
 TNA, SP/14, 27th June 1625. 
49
 9LYLHQQH$OGRXVµCokayne, Sir William (1559/60±1626)¶ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 




investments made by EIC members outside the Company. Many members only held one or 
two other investments, but others had developed considerable wide-ranging portfolios.  
 
 
Figure 9: Number of other investments undertaken by EIC members, 1624 
 
Figure 10: EIC member's investments in other ventures, 1624 
The investments available in early modern London now included a range of new 
ventures alongside resurgent older companies. For example, projects in Guiana, 
















































Company, Eastland Company and Merchant Adventurers re-emerged as attractive ventures.50 
Figure 10 shows where EIC members invested during this period, and, as was the case in 1599 
and 1613, they did so across a wide range of different companies.51 The Virginia Company 
remained the most popular investment for EIC members, which attracted seventy-five (31.4%) 
of them. Following the Virginia Company, the Levant Company was the most popular 
investment, with fifty-two (21.8%) of EIC members joining this organisation. After this, the 
French Company, North-West Passage Company, and New Merchant Adventurers were all 
attractive for EIC members, and around thirty invested in each (18.4%, 17.2%, 16.3% 
respectively). Many of the EIC members in 1624 had experienced the challenges faced by the 
Virginia Company first-hand, and they would have been concerned that the EIC was heading 
in a similar direction ± particularly considering the recent Dutch attack at Amboyna and the 
(,&¶VFRQTXHVWRI2UPX]. Similarly, while fewer members had participated in the Levant or 
French Companies, the argument for a strategy of non-violent trade in Asia may have gained 
support from both groups. On the other hand, the continued launch of other colonial ventures 
to North America suggests that these challenges had not deterred everybody. In either case, the 
spread of investments held by EIC members demonstrates how the global web of English 
overseas activities in this period created a tight network in London that brought together 






































































































Virginia Company N/A 33.3% 29.3% 36.0% 21.3% 14.6% 24.0% 28.0% 
                                                          
50




 For ease of XVHVRPHRIWKHVPDOOHUYHQWXUHVKDYHEHHQJURXSHGWRJHWKHUDVµRWKHUFRORQLDO¶7KLVLQFOXGHVWKH
Guiana Company and Plymouth Company, which each included a single member of the EIC, the Newfoundland 




Levant Company 48.1% N/A 26.9% 36.5% 32.7% 11.5% 17.3% 25.0% 
French Company 40.0% 43.2% N/A 36.4% 27.3% 15.9% 25.0% 15.9% 
North-West 
Passage Company 65.9% 46.3% 36.7% N/A 22.0% 26.8% 19.5% 41.5% 
Privateering 59.3% 63.0% 44.4% 33.4% N/A 18.5% 25.9% 25.9% 
Irish Company 52.4% 28.6% 33.3% 52.4% 23.8% N/A 19.0% 23.8% 
New Merchant 
Adventurers 
46.2% 23.1% 28.2% 20.5% 17.9% 10.3% N/A 10.3% 
Somers Island  
Company 91.3% 56.5% 30.4% 73.9% 30.4% 21.7% 17.4% N/A 
Table 4: Likelihood of EIC members investing in two other ventures together, 1624 
 
 Significant overlaps between investors in different overseas activities is demonstrated 
in table 4. There are a number of particularly strong correlations. For example, EIC members 
investing in the Somers Island Company were 91.3% likely to be part of the Virginia Company 
too and 73.9% likely to have invested in the North-West Passage Company. Other ventures 
attracted much less interest from these individuals, such as the New Merchant Adventurers 
who attracted only 17.4%.  It suggests that Somers Island Company investors who were part 
of the EIC had some specific ideas about what sort of ventures they wanted to participate in ± 
WKRVHRIWKHµQRQ-WUDGLQJ¶YDULHW\That this group also invested in the EIC suggests that they 
viewed it in similar way to the other ventures: expecting profits over the long-term, accepting 
higher risks, and being open to the possibility of fortification and settlement in Asia. 
 However, there was little development of such specific portfolios among most members 
in the Company. EIC members in the Levant Company were also Virginia Company investors 
48.1% of the time; 36.4% of members in the French Company were also part of the North-
West Passage Company; and the French Company attracted 44.4% of members who had 
invested in privateering ventures. As this suggests, the different types of overseas venture 
launched from England during this period all attracted interest from members of the EIC and 
these investors did not limit their portfolios to only one type of venture. The Company was not 




does not accurately reflect investment in overseas ventures across the commercial community 
nor did it define the approach taken by the EIC in Asia. 
Figure 11 compares the types of venture that attracted EIC members to the regularity 
with which these members invested. Unsurprisingly, the investors with the largest portfolios 
were likely to have invested widely, and every EIC member with five or more investments took 
SDUWLQERWKµWUDGLQJ¶DQGµQRQ-WUDGLQJ¶YHQWXUHV6LPLODUO\RI(,&PHPEHUVZLWKWKUHH




Figure 11: EIC members investing in different types of venture depending on the size of 
portfolios, 1624 
 
This demonstrates how the Company retained a senior core with experience of non-
trading activities but suggests that less experienced groups, those with two or less investments 
outside the Company, were beginning to lose the connection with non-trading ventures that 
KDGEHHQDSSDUHQWLQ$PRQJRFFDVLRQDOLQYHVWRUVWKHQXPEHUWKDWLQYHVWHGLQµWUDGLQJ¶
as oppoVHGWRµQRQ-WUDGLQJ¶YHQWXUHVZDVLQFUHDVLQJ)XUWKHUPRUHIDUIHZHURIWKHVHLQYHVWRUV
had invested in the North-West Passage Company in 1612 ± less than half the number that had 
this experience in 1613. Together, this suggests that members of the EIC in 1624 were younger 
(or junior) members of the commercial community who had not been investing when these 
earlier companies launched. Additionally, these investors, some of whom only joined the 
Company in 1623 through the second joint stock, had started their investment portfolios during 































































these newcomers were not necessarily opposed to the idea of non-trading ventures, it could 
suggest that the EIC was less able to draw on people with this experience as time went on or 
that a new group of merchants emerged in the 1620s who were more opposed to non-trading 
activities.  
 In 1624 then, the EIC included 152 members who had invested in other overseas 
ventures. The relationships developed through this shared experience can be plotted, as before, 
as a network (figure 12). EIC members shared 6012 connections through shared investments 
and were drawn together into four different, but highly connected, communities. The largest 
community (dark grey) contained 32.2% of the network and included individuals more closely 
connected with the Virginia Company. 27.0% were defined by relationships around the Levant 
Company and Spanish Company (light grey). Nodes identified through their investment in one 
the two Merchant Adventurers organisations (white) include 26.3% of the network. Finally, 
the smallest community (dark grey), containing 14.5% of the network, indicates people not 
aligned with any particular set of ventures or other community within the network. It includes 
investors in the French and Irish companies, but these two organisations had only limited 
connections between them. Many individuals within these defined groups had many 
relationships with people from the other communities, and the density of the network 
demonstrates how the EIC continued to attract people with a wide range of commercial 





Further analysis of the 1599, 1613 and 1624 networks reveals the strength of the EIC 
DQG WKH VWUHQJWK RI PHPEHUV¶ UHODWLRQVKLSV ZLWK RQH DQRWKHU $QDO\VLQJ WKH µEHWZHHQQHVV
FHQWUDOLW\¶RI WKHQHWZRUNVZKLFKPHDVXUHV WKHDYHUDJHSDWK OHQJWKZLWKLQ WKHQHWZorks to 
indicate the strength of the network, demonstrates the continued impact of the EIC in increasing 
the interconnectivity of the commercial community.52 When founded in 1599 the EIC network 





had an average path length of 1.397. In 1613, the EIC this had increased to 1.477 between 
nodes and this remained almost as strong in 1624, at 1.483. This suggests that the internal 
network of the EIC remained tightly connected, with many members bringing relationships 
into the Company from other commercial ventures and building new relationships through 
involvement in the EIC. Furthermore, it indicates that the global focus of the commercial 
community seen in 1599 and 1613 was still strong in 1624. In spite of the challenges facing the 
commercial community, many people continued to invest together and develop networks that 
enabled the expansion of English overseas activity. 
Analysing the 1624 network also indicates some issues developing within the EIC. In 
particular, the diffusion of directors across the network became much more noticeable. More 
directors were part of peripheral clusters and separated from other directors through a lack of 
shared interests. While the overall network remained strong, this would indicate a growing 





With this in mind, an examination of the directors of the Company between 1600 and 1625 
offers some indication of how these relationships influenced Company policy. In figure 13, the 
commercial relationships between directors in 1600, 1606, 1613, 1619 and 1625 are 
represented. The first column shows all of the relationships between directors through shared 
FRPPHUFLDODFWLYLWLHVWKHVHFRQGUHPRYHVUHODWLRQVKLSVIURPµQRQ-WUDGLQJ¶ ventures, and does 
QRWLQFOXGHµWUDGLQJ¶FRQQHFWLRQV 
 7KH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI QXPHURXV µQRQ-WUDGLQJ¶ YHQWXUHV DIWHU  LQFUHDVHG WKH
importance of colonial ventures in the portfolios of directors considerably. Colonial 
connections were strongest in 1613 thanks to the recent growth of the Virginia and Irish 
Companies, both of which attracted considerable interest. It perhaps should not be surprising 
that 1613 was also the busiest period for the Company in terms of its own colonial activities. 
In this period, the Company was developing three villages in Dundaniel, Ireland, to take 
advantage of commodity extraction from the island.53 At the same time, the Company 
increasingly used violence as part of its strategy to access markets in Asia by targeting the 
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Portuguese.54 The Company was willing to undertake non-trading activities as an organisation 
and the make-XSRIPHPEHUV¶SRUWIROLRVGHPRQVWUDWHVKRZPDQ\RIWKHVHZHUHKDSS\ZLth 
these activities in principle.  
 






Figure 13: Networks of shared experiences between EIC directors, 1600-1625 
 
 Growing disputes in LondRQ¶V FRPPHUFLDO FRPPXQLW\ FOHDUO\ VHHQ in factionalism 
ravaging the Virginia Company, were not excluded from the EIC.55 Here, disagreements 
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 Craven, Dissolution of the Virginia Company. 
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between a group with different views of Company strategy and leadership became increasingly 
noticeable during the same period. The long-time supporter of the Company, Sir Dudley 
'LJJHVFRPPHQWHGLQWKDWGLVSXWHVZLWKLQWKH&RPSDQ\KDGµDOPRVWWRUQWKDWERGLHVLQ
SLHFHV¶DQGWKHVHDUJXPHQWVFDQEHVHHQFOHDrly during General Courts and elections from this 
period.56 In part, these arguments focused on the failure of the Company to operate as profitably 
at this time, and the capture of Ormuz and conflict with the Dutch highlighted how the 
Company was increasingly participating in expensive, non-trading activities. 
7KHJHQHUDOLW\¶VUHDFWLRQDJDLQVWWKHVHDFWLYLWLHVFDQEHVHHQLQWKHFKRLFHRIGLUHFWRUV
elected to lead the Company between 1613 and 1625. Declining colonial experience in the 
board of directors demonstrates how the choice in directors shifted. Directors with non-trading 
experience were still prominent in 1619 but strength of their network was already weakening 
as directors still investing in a wide range of activities became less common and individuals 
with smaller portfolios of investments joined the ranks. This shift continued, and sped up, 
between 1619 and 1625. In the final years of this period, the number of directors with non-
trading experience declined considerably. As shown in figure 13, the network representing 
shared non-trading experiences is sparsely populated in comparison to previous years, with a 
number of directors having no colonial experiences at all.  
The election of this group of directors owed much to the recent execution of EIC 
employees at Amboyna. During the General Court, the issue of limited state support against 
the Dutch East India Company was raised, with some members of the generality unwilling to 
LQYHVWIXUWKHULQWKH&RPSDQ\XQWLOµWKHCompany can be relieved by the sWDWHHIIHFWXDOO\¶57 
In this environment, an aversion to directors known as proponents of non-trading activities is 
unsurprising. These graphs include historic relationships and this decline of colonial experience 
among directors in 1625 was not just a sign that EIC members were turning against investment 
in this direction; the generality made a conscious decision to reduce the number of directors 
who had ever invested in this area. By 1625, EIC members were still likely to have invested 
non-trading ventures but recent challenges in this area led to the election of officials who were 
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Over the first twenty-five years of its history, the EIC attracted hundreds of new investors who 
all brought their own relationships, experiences and expectations with them. Many had 
considerable experience of overseas enterprise and the governance of the Company was driven 
by the different experiences obtained through other activities. These affected discussions about 
VWUDWHJ\WKDWGHILQHGWKH(QJOLVKSUHVHQFHLQ$VLDIRUGHFDGHVWRFRPH0HPEHUV¶H[SHULHQFHV
affected how the Company sought to direct its business and the expectations these investors 
had of the Company. Investors were only willing to wait for profits to accrue for a certain 
amount of time and the Company had to be careful to balance demands for short-term gain 
with its need to invest in long-term infrastructure. Considering the different experiences of 
investors, from those who had invested in less risky, shorter-term trades to those willing to 
invest in highly risky long-term ventures such as exploration and settlements overseas, the EIC 
was built on a foundation of diverse interests and experiences, and its later strategy and 
development was deeply affected as a consequence. 
This analysis has also demonstrated the global connections between the various strands 
RI(QJODQG¶VRYHUVHDVGHYHORSPHQWKDYHUDUHO\EHHQWKHIRFXVRIKLVWRULcal works; divisions, 
rather than collaborations, have dominated study of this period. Instead of focussing on the 
Atlantic world or a Levant-East India Company combine, the investments of EIC members 
suggest a more connected, global analysis of English overseas activity has solid foundations. 
Early modern merchants were global actors through their interaction with diverse parts of the 
world, and the experience of investing globally radically altered the shape and strength of 
/RQGRQ¶VFRPPHUFLDOFRPPXQLW\By removing some of the artificial barriers within British 
imperial history we find a story of collaboration and interconnection as much as conflict and 
competition. 
